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The Technology Split in Customer
List Interpretation
Alan E. Littmannt
A "technology split" has developed among courts over the treat-
ment of customer lists. Although courts for years have held that com-
panies' customer data is freely alienable,' recent cases involving Inter-
net companies imply otherwise.2 Customer advocates, academics, regu-
lators, and legislators are now pointing to the Internet as the final bat-
tleground for privacy. Members of these groups warn that personal
information may be gleaned from customers' online activities and
used to steal their identities,' expose their children to sexual preda-
tors,' or reveal their private medical conditions.
t A.B. 1996; J.D. Candidate 2003, The University of Chicago.
1 See John D. Penn, Internet Privacy: An Oxymoron, 2000 ABI J Lexis 81, *6 (describing
the privacy debate about customer lists and noting that "[l]ost in the debate is the fact that cus-
tomer lists and other information provided by customers have been bought and sold for dec-
ades"). See also Robert L. Eisenbach III, The Internet Company's Customer List:Asset or Liabil-
ity?, 18 Computer & Internet Law 25, 25 (2001) ("In the 'bricks and mortars' world, customer
lists are bought and sold regularly.").
2 For instance, the bankruptcy of Toysmart.com and the cases that came in its wake imply
a significant restriction on selling customer lists. See Richard A. Beckmann, Comment, Privacy
Policies and Empty Promises: Closing the "Toysmart Loophole," 62 U Pitt L Rev 765, 765-70
(2001) (providing a summary of the Toysmart.com litigation and the concerns of both sides of
the debate and noting that "[b]ankruptcy is the most recent battleground in the struggle between
customers and businesses over control of personal information").
3 See Editorial, Protecting Online Privacy, NY Tunes A18 (May 20,2002) (advocating the
passage of the Online Personal Privacy Act because it would "give individuals more control"
over their private information).
4 For a general discussion, see Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission be-
fore the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Online Profiling-
Benefits and Concerns, 1236 PLI/Corp 297 (2001) (warning that companies can use customer in-
formation to create profiles of people and apply for credit cards and otherwise transact under
their identities). See also Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 Mich
Telecomm & Tech L Rev 97,111-12 (2001) (noting that "identity thieves have gone on shopping
sprees at the expense of their victims" and that "the possibilities for abuse through identity theft
will grow as the functionality of the Internet expands"); Brandon McKelvey, Comment, Financial
Institutions' Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Customer's Personal Information Secure from the
Threat of Identity Theft, 34 UC Davis L Rev 1077, 1082 (2001) ("A financial institutions' collec-
tion and use of personal information directly connects them with the growing problem of iden-
tity theft.").
5 See Hetcher, 7 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 97 at 112 (cited in note 4) ("Another type
of harm that has received a good deal of attention is predation on children'); Federal Trade
Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress 5 (June 1998), available online at
<http:llwww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf> (visited June 12, 2002) (citing a Justice De-
partment investigation revealing that online services and bulletin boards are "quickly becoming
the most powerful resources used by predators to identify and contact children" as well as anec-
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While these concerns may be real, they are certainly not new. Off-
line companies' customer lists have been collected and sold regularly.
Courts, therefore, need to filter through the rhetoric when dealing
with the seemingly new phenomenon of Internet customer lists.
Courts should maintain the sound legal analysis that has been applied
to companies' ownership of customer lists for years-and that contin-
ues to be applied outside of cyberspace.
This Comment argues that recent court decisions and high-profile
settlements have unnecessarily distinguished between "online" and
"offline" companies,8 creating a "technology split." This distinction is
harmful because it is both unenforceable and counterproductive.
Rather than distinguishing on the basis of technology, courts should
treat customer lists uniformly across companies and follow the exten-
sive pre-Internet case law on customer lists.
Part I describes customer lists and the current controversy over
their use by Internet companies. Part II reviews the treatment of cus-
tomer lists in the case law. Part III compares Internet customer lists
with traditional lists and argues that separate, nonuniform treatment is
unwarranted. Part IV explains why this separate treatment is actually
harmful to both companies and customers. Finally, Part V proposes
guidelines for handling future customer list cases.
I. CUSTOMER LISTS AND PRIVACY
This Part presents an overview of customer lists and the manner
in which they have historically been gathered and used. New technol-
ogy gives companies increased capabilities for collecting customer lists
and this Part discusses how these new capabilities have created con-
cern over privacy rights.
A. What Are Customer Lists?
A customer list is much more than the name suggests. In addition
to compiling the names of previous or prospective customers,' a com-
dotal evidence that children in web chatrooms increasingly receive inappropriate advances from
adults).
6 See Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century 10-12
(O'Reilly 2000).
7 See Eisenbach, Internet Company's Customer List at 25 (cited in note 1).
8 While these are inappropriate labels, for reasons stated in Part III.D, this Comment will
continue to use them for the sake of simplicity.
9 Customer lists should not be confused with other privacy issues such as the fight against
Carnivore, which is not within the scope of this Comment. Carnivore is an Internet monitoring
system developed by the FBI that allegedly is able to filter Internet traffic and deliver suspicious
information to the FBI. See Thomas R. McCarthy, Don't Fear Carnivore: It Won't Devour Indi-
vidual Privacy, 66 Mo L Rev 827,828-89 (2001).
10 See, for example, In re McGee, 157 Bankr 966, 971, 975 (E D Va 1993) (involving a cus-
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pany may gather a significant amount of personal information that
helps explain its customers' preferences and spending habits. For ex-
ample, American Express for years has collected extensive informa-
tion about the spending habits of its customers." Before its demise in
2000, online toy retailer Toysmart.com collected similar information,
such as customers' "billing information, shopping preferences, and
family profiles.'12 CVS, Kmart, and Wal-Mart also participated in a
plan whereby they combined their sales data from stores worldwide
and sold the data to marketing companies and drugmakers.
1 3
A company can create tremendous value by using a customer list
for cross-marketing efforts. For instance, information that a company
gathers from selling cookbooks can be used to identify customers who
are also interested in purchasing the company's kitchen supplies. Third
parties are also potential purchasers of customer information.14 A
backpacking equipment retailer, for example, might find the subscrip-
tion list to Backpacker magazine tremendously valuable. The more de-
tailed and extensive the list is, the more valuable it becomes."
B. New Technology, New Capabilities, New Dangers?
The Internet has brought a new wave of controversy over the col-
lection and sale of customer lists.'6 Customer groups and commenta-
tomer list that contained a "list of vendors across the country," and discussing another case in-
volving a list of customers).
11 See Dwyer v American Express Co, 273 Ill App 3d 742,652 NE2d 1351,1353 (1995) (de-
scribing how defendants "categorize and rank their card holders into ... tiers based on spending
habits" for the purpose of which they "analyze where [customers] shop and how much they
spend, ... behavior characteristics and spending histories"). See also Jeff Sweat, Privacy: Can
Businesses Build Trust and Exploit Opportunity?, InformationWeek.com (Aug 20, 2001), avail-
able online at <http://www.informationveek.com/story/VK20010817S0004> (visited May 30,
2002) (describing how Harrah's "records how often a person stays at a hotel, even the kind of
room he or she prefers").
12 Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Sues Failed Website Toysmart.com, for
Deceptively Offering for Sale Personal Information of Website Visitors (July 10, 2000), available
online at <http:/vww.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart.htm> (visited Feb 5,2002).
13 See John Rendleman, Customer Data Means Money, InformationWeek.com (Aug 20,
2001), available online at <http.//vww.informationweek.com/story/IWK20010816S008> (visited
June 12,2002).
14 A rough estimate is that companies will pay about $150 per 1,000 names. See id.
15 See, for example, Dwyer, 652 NE2d at 1353 (describing how American Express would
"offer to create a list of cardholders who would most likely shop in a particular store" or "who
purchase specific types of items" and "rent that list to the merchant"). Companies can also in-
crease the value of their customer list by categorizing customers, which enables buyers of the list
to target those customers more effectively in a particular marketing demographic. A company
can place the customer information in a database and sort and categorize it according to numer-
ous factors that might be of interest to a buyer. By investing in the list itself, the company can
create an asset that is significantly more valuable than a mere list of customer information.
16 See Sean Doherty, Keeping Data Private, Network Computing 83, 83 (June 25, 2001)
("Potential customers hesitate to part with private information on the Internet when they don't
know how the information will be used and who will be using it. Jupiter Research estimates that
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tors point out that the Internet has reduced the cost of both gathering
customer information and using it to target new customers.17 Compa-
nies using the Internet can gather more specific, and potentially more
intrusive, information than their offline counterparts. '" For instance,
while traditional companies could only discover what a customer pur-
chased, online companies can record what products consumers
browsed-even if they eventually chose not to buy.9 By using cookie
technology, website owners can monitor what products a user
browsed, thereby allowing analysts to deduce customers' interests
even if they do not purchase anything.
The increased volume of information collected by Internet com-
panies has led to a rash of warnings that customer privacy and safety
may be in jeopardy. Some customer advocates fear that gathering cus-
tomer information will lead to predation on children, identity theft, or
the illicit use of medical information."0 Customer advocates also fear
that companies will share this information with political groups or
other potentially sensitive and intrusive organizations.2'
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), concerned by the addi-
tional capabilities that online companies possess through their use of
technology, now regularly monitors online privacy.n Numerous articles
Internet-related business will lose $18 billion in unrealized transactions because of privacy con-
cerns by 2003."); TRUSTe, TRUSTe Guidelines on Personally Identifiable Information Uses in
Mergers; Acquisitions, Bankruptcies; Closures, and Dissolutions of Web Sites (submitted for public
comment Apr 11, 2001), available online at <http:llwww.truste.comlprograms/mabs.doc> (visited
Oct 3, 2002) (describing the Internet era as one "marked by increasing customer vigilance over
privacy" and urging that "in an increasingly connected world, customers must have mechanisms
that give them full control over their personal, private information so that they can protect their
privacy"). See also Kate Miller, TRUSTe Unveils Privacy Guidelines, Industry Standard (Apr 12,
2001) (quoting privacy concerns voiced by TRUSTe and an analyst at the Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center).
17 See Erika S. Koster, Zero Privacy: Personal Data on the Internet, 16 No 5 Computer Law
7, 7 (May 1999) (arguing that the Internet has influenced privacy by reducing the cost of infor-
mation and improving the ability of companies to target customers).
1 See id.
19 See id (describing "cookie" technology and noting that, "New technology and more
powerful computers now make it possible, without the visitor's knowledge, for companies to re-
cord and track information about visitors to their websites, including ... which portions of the
site were visited and for how long.").
20 See Hetcher, 7 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 97 at 6 (cited in note 4) (discussing poten-
tial misuses of customer information); Garfinkel, Database Nation at 10-12 (cited in note 6);
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online:A Report at 5 (cited in note 5).
21 See Aaron Pressman, Voter.com to Sell Membership List, Industry Standard (Mar 15,
2001), available online at <http://www.thestandard.comlarticlelO,1902,22894,00.html> (visited
June 12,2002) (describing how an Internet portal for politics attempted to sell the political party
affiliations of its members).
22 The FrC now issues annual reports about online privacy. See Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to Con-
gress 3-5 (May 2000) (discussing the three reports on online privacy that the FTC submitted to
Congress in 1998-2000).
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have also stressed the need for additional regulation of the Internet
and have urged courts and legislators to force companies to respect
the privacy rights of their customers." Some commentators even advo-
cate allocating property rights in personal information to customers.24
Internet companies, in turn, have responded to increased privacy
concerns by placing disclosures on their websites notifying visitors
how their personal information will be used." These disclosures, how-
ever, have done little to alleviate customer concerns. In fact, a recent
survey showed that few consumers trust online disclaimers; 92 percent
of respondents agreed with the statement, "I don't trust companies to
keep personal information about me confidential, no matter what they
promise."26
C. A Reason for Skepticism
Customers may have good reason not to trust Internet compa-
nies' privacy policies. The policies are often ambiguous7 For example,
LexisNexis provides the following catchall disclaimer:
Circumstances may arise where we are required to disclose your
personal information to third parties for purposes other than to
support your customer relationship .... such as in connection
with a corporate divestiture or dissolution ... or if disclosure is
required by law or is pertinent to judicial or governmental inves-
tigations or proceedings.2
23 See Editorial, Protecting Online Privacy, NY Tunes at A18 (cited in note 3).
24 See, for example, Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan L
Rev 1283, 1289-95 (discussing the various arguments for protecting data privacy with property
rights).
25 For example, on its website, <http://www.lexisnexis.comlterms/privacy> (visited Apr 6,
2002), LexisNexis states in part:
Our Web Site is not set up to automatically collect personally identifiable information from
each visitor to our Web Site. It does recognize the home server of visitors, but not e-mail
addresses.... This information is used only for internal purposes by our technical support
staff ... Our Web Site does track certain information about the visits to our Web Site....
[LexisNexis] may enhance or merge your information collected at its Web Site with data
from third parties for purposes of marketing products or services to you.
26 Steve Lohr, Survey Shows Few Trust Promises on Online Privacy, NY Times C4 (Apr 17,
2000) (discussing a 2000 survey of 3000 U.S. households conducted by the market research firm
Odyssey).
27 See William McGeveran, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76
NYU L Rev 1812, 1812 (2001) ("Privacy policies of typical sites ... contain hidden, verbose, jar-
gon-cluttered statements that provide little guidance about the practices of the site's operator").
28 LexisNexis Privacy Statement <http://vww.lexdsnexis.com/terms/privacy> (visited Apr 6,
2002).
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Even the companies that display these warnings often seem to ignore
them blatantly. The most famous example of disregard is described in
In re Toysmart.com.2
Web retailer Toysmart.com, founded in 1998, started out as a
moderate success, achieving more than $6 million in sales in Decem-
ber 1999.3 During this time, Toysmart.com had a privacy policy that
assured customers of the company's commitment to privacy and spe-
cifically stated that customer information would "never be shared with
a third party."
31
Toysmart.com's tactics shifted, though, when it ran into financial
trouble. After Toysmart.com entered bankruptcy in 2000, it began
searching for a company to buy its customer list." By seeking to sell
the customer list, it sought only to maximize the value of its bank-
ruptcy estate in order to pay its creditors. However, consumer advo-
cates and politicians were outraged.33 Toysmart.com was excoriated in
the media for allegedly violating its customers' privacy and for disre-
garding previous promises.3 The FrC responded by filing a complaint
that sought to enjoin the sale." The complaint charged Toysmart.com
29 Petition for involuntary bankruptcy, Chapter 11 Case No 00-13995-CJK (Bankr D Mass
filed June 9,2000).
30 Glenn R. Simpson, FTC Is Set to Challenge Toysmart.com to Prevent the Sale of Cus-
tomer Data, Wall St J A3 (July 10, 2000).
31 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Sues (cited in note 12). The policy
read in full:
Personal information, voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name, address,
billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party. ... When
you register with Toysmart.com, you can rest assured that your information will never be
shared with a third party.
32 Upon filing, Toysmart.com listed $10.5 million in assets, including the customer list, and
liabilities of $29 million. See Motion for Authority to Sell Inventory by Private Sale Free and
Clear of Liens, Claims and Encumbrances, In re Toysmartcom, Chapter 11 Case No 00-13995-
CJK (D Mass filed June 23,2000). While it was not clear how much the list was worth, estimates
placed the number of individuals on the list at approximately 250,000. See Matt Richtel, Toys-
marL com in Settlement with ETC, NY Times C1 (July 22,2000). See also Greg Sandoval, Failed
Dot-Corns May Be Selling Your Private Information, News.con (June 29,2000), available online
at <http://news.com.com/2100-1017-242649.html?legacy=cnet> (visited Feb 15, 2002) (noting
that Toysmart.com advertised the sale of its customer list and database in The Wall Street Journal
after shutting down).
33 See generally Commentary, Congress Needs to Pass Legislation to Protect Personal Data
When Internet Companies Go Bankrupt, San Jose Mercury News (Apr 9, 2001); Hal E Morris
and Flora A. Fearson, Texas Attorney General. Privacy Is Not for Sale, 2000 ABI J Lexis 86, *4
(arguing that companies have no right to sell customer lists in violation of their privacy state-
ments).
34 See Commentary, Congress Needs to Pass Legislation, San Jose Mercury News (cited in
note 33).
35 See First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Reliet
FTC v Toysmart.com, Civil Action No 00-11341-RGS, available online at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2000/07/toysmartcomplaint.htm> (visited Feb 5,2002).
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with violating child protection laws- and engaging in deceptive prac-
tices in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.' Numerous state attorneys general also intervened, alleging the
violation of state customer protection acts.3
In the face of the legal and political pressure, Toysmart.com and
the FTC reached a settlement permitting the company to sell the list
only to qualified buyers in the same general market as Toysmart.com
who promised to abide by the original policy.39 However, critics de-
rided the agreement for not protecting customers, 4 and the bank-
ruptcy court ultimately rejected the proposed settlement.'
The disposition of the list was eventually resolved when Disney
purchased Toysmart.com ' and destroyed the list under the supervision
36 See id at 19-20 (alleging that Toysmart.com had collected information about children
without parental consent in violation of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 USC
§ 6503 (2000)).
37 See id at 16-18 (alleging that Toysmart.com, by representing that it would never sell
customer information, had engaged in a deceptive practice in violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 USC § 45(a)).
38 See Memorandum and Order on the State of Texas Motion to Intervene, FTC v Toys-
mart.corn, LLC, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 21963 (D Mass). See also Objection of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts and 46 States to the Debtor's Motion to Approve Settlement with Federal
Trade Commission and for Authority to Enter into Consent Agreement, In re Toysmart.com
(Bankr D Mass filed Aug 10, 2000), available online at <http:llwww.naag.orglfeatures/
Final%200pposition%20to%20FTC%2OSettlement.pdf> (visited July 22, 2002) ("The States
earlier filed an objection to the Debtor's proposed sale of its 'Customer List"' because "that sale
would constitute an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of the Customer Protection Acts of
the States").
39 See Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, FTC v Toysmart.com, Civil Action
No 00-11341-RGS (D Mass July 21, 2000), available online at <http:llwww.ftc.govlos/2000107/
toysmartconsent.htm> (visited June 12,2002) (ordering that "absent approval by the Bankruptcy
Court ... of the sale of the Customer Information to a Qualified Buyer or a reorganization plan,
Defendants ... shall, on or before August 31,2000, delete or destroy all Customer Information in
their possession, custody or control" and defining "Qualified Buyer" as "an entity that (1) con-
centrates its business in the family commerce market, involving the areas of education, toys,
learning, home and/or instruction .... and (2) expressly agrees to the obligations set forth in the
Stipulation and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Information").
40 See, for example, Objection of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and 46 States to the
Debtor's Motion to Approve Settlement with Federal Trade Commission and for Authority to
Enter Into Consent Agreement, In re Toysmart.com (filed Aug 10, 2000) (asserting that "the FTC
proposes that Toysmart sell its customer list to a third party" and standing by its objection "that
such a sale of the customer list to a third party is an unfair or deceptive actor practice").
41 See Order Denying Motions to Approve Stipulation with Federal Trade Commission
and for Authority to Enter into Consent Agreement by Toysmart.com, In re Toysmart.com (filed
Aug 17, 2000), available online at <http://pacer.mab.uscourts.govbccgi-binlrundktpl> (visited
June 26,2002). One FTC commissioner who had voted against the settlement even went so far as
to argue that no sale of the customer list should ever be permitted. See Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, available online at
<http'//wwv.ftc.govlos200007/toysmartswindlestatement.htm> (visited Feb 5, 2002) ("Toysmart
promised its customers that their personal information would never be sold to a third party, but
the Bankruptcy Order in fact would allow a sale to a third party. In my view, such a sale should
not be permitted because 'never' really means never.").
42 Buena Vista Internet Group, a subsidiary of Disney, owned 60 percent of Toysmart.com
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of the bankruptcy court. 3 The ramifications of the dispute, however,
continued to spread throughout the online retailing industry. After
Toysmart.com, several other companies experienced similar customer
list problems. For instance, when Living.com, an online home furnish-
ing retailer that had also posted a privacy policy on its site," filed for
bankruptcy, it avoided a court battle by reaching a settlement with the
Texas attorney general. Under this settlement, Living.com agreed to
sell only nonfinancial information about its customers. 4  Another
bankruptcy settlement with Craftshop.com was concluded under simi-
lar constraints."
This approach has had an important impact on the ability of
online companies to use their most important asset: their customer
lists. Although we may never know how many companies have been
discouraged from selling their lists because of these statements, cases
such as Living.com's and Craftshop.com's are clearly noticed by com-
panies and consumers alike. Fry's Electronics's bid to buy Egg-
head.com is a good example. Fry's bid $10 million to buy Egg-
head.com and its customer list.4' Before transferring the customer list,
however, Egghead's customers were to be given an opportunity to
"opt out'8 and therefore not have their information transferred to
Fry's. Because this might significantly dissipate the value of the asset it
sought to purchase, Fry's conditioned the sale on no more than 10 per-
prior to the complete sale. See Brad Eric Scheler, Bankruptcy Issues for High Tech Companies,
1255 PLI/Corp 351,369 (May/June 2001).
43 Stephanie Stoughton, Toysmart.com List to Be Destroyed, Boston Globe D7 (Jan 30,
2001) (reporting that the bankruptcy judge had approved the destruction of Toysmart.com's cus-
tomer list).
44 See Office of the Texas Attorney General, Press Release, Comyn Announces Privacy
Settlement with Living.com (Sept 25, 2000), available online at <http:/lwwv.oag.state.tx.us/
newspubs/releases2000200009251iving.com.htm> (visited Feb 5,2002) (noting that Living.com's
privacy policy stated, "Living.com does not sell, trade or rent your personal information to others
without your consent. We may choose to do so in the future with trustworthy third parties, but
you can tell us not to by sending a blank email to never@living.com.").
45 Eisenbach, Internet Company's Customer List at 27 (cited in note 1) ("Living.com
agreed to destroy its customer personal financial information but was permitted to transfer non-
financial information only if customers did not opt-out after receiving a notice via email of a
proposed transfer."). Texas Attorney General John Cornyn heralded the settlement by proclaim-
ing: "It is important that Internet companies respect Texans' privacy rights whether the company
is in the black-or in the red. This settlement will set the standard for future settlements and pro-
tect Texans' privacy rights." Office of the Texas Attorney General, Press Release, Cornyn An-
nounces (cited in note 44).
46 See Marjorie Chertok and Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying, Securing and Maxi-
mizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 Am Bankr Inst L Rev
255, 302 (2000) (describing how, in order to use its customer list, the purchaser of bankrupt
Craftshop.com was required to continue the use of the Craftshop name).
47 Troy Wolverton, Egghead Sale Could Crack on Privacy Issues, News.corn (Aug 24,2001),
available online at <http://news.com.com/2100-1017-272130.html> (visited July 22,2002).
48 Id. An opt-out policy generally requires that a letter be sent to the customer requesting a
reply if he does not want his information transferred to a third party. See id.
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cent of Egghead.com's active customers opting out.'9 Eventually the
deal fell through and Amazon.com agreed to buy Egghead.com for
$6.1 million and abide by email spamming constraints. 1 At a mini-
mum, therefore, the restrictions on selling customer lists have made
deals involving customer lists more expensive and have resulted in a
lower return for companies trying to sell their customer lists. Yet, the
impact could go far beyond this if companies are discouraged from
creating lists altogether or are destroying their lists for fear that at-
tempting to sell them will generate bad press or lessen their ability to
sell their other assets.
D. Legislative Proposals
Outside the bankruptcy court, legislators have also attempted to
address online privacy concerns. For instance, bills have been intro-
duced recently to prohibit online companies from selling their lists af-
ter filing for bankruptcy.' Other proposed bills would regulate the use
of online information, either gathered or sold. 3 Although the various
49 See id (quoting an intellectual property lawyer as reasoning that since "the 10 percent
figure is so low, it indicates that the customer list is the main asset that Fry's cares about," and es-
timating that the list consisted of 4 million customers, 1.3 million of whom were "active").
5o Mark Franco, Mergers & Acquisitions: Few Wanted to Make a 4Q Deal, Catalog Age
(Mar 1, 2002), available online at <http:lcatalogagemag.comlar/marketing-mergers__
acquisitions.few/index.htm> (visited July 22,2002).
51 Bob Liu, Eggheadcorn Becomes Amazon.corn Property, Seattle Internet News (Dec 3,
2001), available online at <http:llwww.interetnews.comlbus-newslarticle.php/3-932871> (visited
July 22,2002).
52 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 § 231, S 420, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 1, 2001)
(passed Senate, passed House as HR 333, engrossed in Committee) (amendment aimed at pro-
tection of nonpublic personal information); Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of
2000, S 2857,106th Cong, 2d Sess (July 12, 2000) (engrossed in Senate) (a bill to exclude person-
ally identifiable information from the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy). While these changes to
the bankruptcy code have been proposed to solve this problem, they would likely only create
more confusion. Companies that previously would have filed for bankruptcy may instead at-
tempt to sell the list outside bankruptcy or sell the company in its entirety, thereby transferring
the list without involving the prohibitions likely to be placed on them if the changes to the bank-
ruptcy code are accepted). See Paul Davidson, Hot Commodity: Dot-com Lists: Creditors' Asset
of Choice, Natl Post E02 (Mar 5,2001) (citing research conducted by a Webmergers.com study,
which found that at least 95 e-tailors failed in 2000 "and many did not file for bankruptcy court
protection"). See also Steven D. Homan, Attorneys and Wall Street Deal with the Dot-Corn
Downturn, NY L J 5 (Aug 9,2000) (questioning whether new economy companies should seek
bankruptcy protection at all). Companies such as eToys have managed to avoid bankruptcy is-
sues by bundling their customer lists for sale with the company as a whole. See Arlene Wein-
traub, E-Assets for Sale-Dirt Cheap, Business Week EB20 (May 14, 2001) (discussing e-tailer
liquidation options and noting that "eToys says it won't sell its customer information, unless
somebody buys the whole company").
53 See, for example, HR 4814, 106th Cong, 2d Sess (July 10, 2000) (referred to House
Committee on Commerce) (amending Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to make it
unlawful "for a person to sell on the Internet information such person acquired with a pledge
that the information would be kept private and not released or for a person to share or transfer
to another such information on the Internet"). See also Consumer Internet Privacy Enhance-
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bills address a wide variety of activities, the proposals are similar in
that they focus almost exclusively on the Internet.
The proposals consistently reflect the belief that the Internet re-
quires new rules and a new standard when it comes to customer pri-
vacy. For instance, the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Actc
prohibits a "commercial website operator [from collecting] personally
identifiable information online from a user of that website unless the
operator provides (1) notice to the user ... and (2) an opportunity to
that user to limit the use" of the personal information." Senator John
McCain, one of the Act's cosponsors, introduced the bill by distin-
guishing between Internet and traditional commerce.% Although he
acknowledged that "[s]ince the beginning of commerce, business has
sought to learn more about customers," he claimed that the "[t]he
ability of the internet to [collect and use such information] about a
consumer's habits is unprecedented."" Another cosponsor, Senator
John Kerry, compared online and offline privacy and concluded that
the threat is significantly greater online. While the Act actually pro-
posed allocating money for studying the relationship between online
and offline privacy,9 all the specific prohibitions in the Act applied
only to online industries.
This Part has demonstrated how courts, commentators, and legis-
lators have treated online and offline companies' customer lists differ-
ently. The legal distinction must be founded, if at all, on some impor-
tant difference between offline and online companies' use or sale of
customer lists. Maybe the law is attempting to address different cus-
tomer concerns between online and offline companies, or perhaps the
developed law for offline companies is inadequate to cover online
companies. In fact, neither is the case. In the next Part, I demonstrate
that the concerns of offline companies' customers are nearly identical
to those of online companies' customers.
ment Act, S 2928,106th Cong, 2d Sess (July 26,2000) (prohibiting a commercial website operator
from collecting personally identifiable information online from a user unless the operator noti-
fies the user or gives user an opportunity to limit its use).





58 See id. Senator Kerry was particularly concerned about the loss of anonymity online that
results from being able to track consumers when they are only browsing.
59 Id at § 5(b)(3) (authorizing the National Resource Council to "examine the differences,




II. EXISTING CASE LAW ON CUSTOMER LISTS
For those who have followed the bankruptcies of online compa-
nies and the subsequent fights over their customer lists, these issues
may seem like a new frontier. The vast majority of debate surrounding
customer lists either ignores offline precedent or treats it as inapplica-
ble to the current debate. o Interestingly, while online companies' de-
sire to sell their customer lists could have been addressed solely
through traditional contract law, commentators have instead chosen to
confront the issues by referencing privacy rights in personal informa-
tion.6' A common misconception exists that customer lists are new in-
ventions. In fact, references to customer lists have appeared regularly
in case and statutory law for almost three decades. 6 This Part will take
a step back from the recent privacy rhetoric and provide a survey of
customer list precedent.
Courts often treat offline customer list cases without discussing
privacy at all. Instead, courts routinely treat offline customer lists sim-
ply as corporate property. When courts do discuss the privacy con-
cerns of offline customer lists, however, they often rule against con-
sumers who argue that companies use the lists to violate privacy. This
Part discusses the various ways offline customer lists have been
viewed in case law. In general, the case law arises in one of three
broad categories: (1) customer fists as trade secrets of a corporation;
(2) customer lists claimed as property of a corporation; and (3) cus-
tomer lists as the objects of privacy claims against companies that col-
lect or use the lists.
A. Customer Lists as Trade Secrets
Courts most often discuss customer lists in regard to their status
as trade secrets.?' Courts have repeatedly found that customer fists
60 See, for example, Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan L Rev
1125, 1131, 1159-69 (2000) (acknowledging that "the law does not generally recognize the legal
right of individuals to control uses or disclosures of personal data," but focusing almost exclu-
sively on cyberspace information privacy problems). See also Penn, 2000 ABI J Lexis 81 at *6
(cited in note 1) (noting that the privacy debate ignores precedent).
61 See Office of the Texas Attorney General, Press Release, Cornyn Announces (cited in
note 44). See also Walter W. Miller, Jr., and Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy
Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 Houston L Rev 777, 848 (2001) (advocating a regula-
tory approach based upon privacy rights).
62 See, for example, Dwyer v American Express Co, 273 Ill App 3d 742, 652 NE2d 1351
(1995); Eisenbach, 18 Computer & Internet Law at 25 (cited in note 1); Penn, Internet Privacy,
2000 ABI J Lexis 81 at *6 (cited in note 1).
63 See, for example, Defiance Button Machine Co v C & C Metal Products Corp, 759 F2d
1053, 1063 (2d Cir 1985) (holding that the customer list in question was not a trade secret, but
noting that "[a] customer list developed by a business through substantial effort and kept in con-
fidence may be treated as a trade secret and protected at the owner's instance against disclosure
to a competitor, provided the information it contains is not otherwise readily ascertainable");
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qualify as trade secrets as long as such rulings do not interfere with
the basic tenets of state law.6 These cases often have nothing to do
with the Internet and never mention the "rights" of third parties (in
other words, the customers themselves) to the customer information.
In fact, courts routinely treat customer lists as property under trade
secret law without any additional discussion of the rights of custom-
ers -even while the Internet privacy debate rages about them.k This is
not just judge-made law; several states have statutes explicitly recog-
nizing customer lists as viable trade secrets.6 Treating a customer list
as a trade secret affirms corporations' property interests in such lists.
Furthermore, lists that are considered trade secrets are considered
freely alienable, much as trade secrets are in general.
B. Customer Lists as Corporate Property
Aside from considering customer lists to be trade secrets, courts
also explicitly treat customer lists as exclusively corporate property.
For instance, in Miller v Ortman,'7 the Indiana Supreme Court held
that a customer list was a part of "the good will of a business" and
therefore protected under contract principles.u As part of goodwill,
the customer list is freely alienable and owned by the corporation.
Furthermore, Miller can be read as providing an incentive for compa-
nies to invest in collecting customer lists in the first place.
Nearly twenty years later, the Seventh Circuit in In re Uniser-
vices69 referred to Miller approvingly and added that the fact that the
company's "customer information constitutes protectable property is
Avery Dennison Corp v Kitsonas, 118 F Supp 2d 848, 854 (S D Ohio 2000) (holding that a cus-
tomer list is "a trade secret under Ohio law as it is: 'business information or plans, financial in-
formation or listing of names, addresses or telephone numbers"'), citing Ohio Uniform Trade Se-
crets Act, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1331.61; Heritage Benefit Consultants v Cole, 2001 Conn Super
LEXIS 543, *19 (holding that a customer list is a trade secret, which is defined under Connecti-
cut law to include "information, including a compilation, program .... cost data or customer
list"), citing Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Conn Gen Stat § 35 et seq; Hayes-Albion v
Kuberski, 311 NW2d 122, 127 (Mich App 1981) (confirming the trial court's holding that the
plaintiff's customer list was a trade secret).
64 See, for example, Avery Dennison, 118 F Supp 2d at 854; Miller and O'Rourke, 38 Hous-
ton L Rev at 787-88 (cited in note 61) ("That the law often accords customer lists property-type
rights is evident by the number of cases holding them to be trade secrets").
65 Note that the cases cited in note 63 arose between 1981 to 2001, spanning the develop-
ment of the Internet.
66 See, for example, Conn Gen Stat Ann § 35-51(d) (West 2001) ("'[T]rade secret' means
information, including a ... customer list.").
67 235 Ind 641,136 NE2d 17 (1956).
68 Id at 34 ("Public policy is committed to the proposition that a man is free to conduct a
lawful business and that good will of a business ... such as the names and addresses and re-
quirements of customers ... is a property right which an owner is entitled to protect.").
69 517 F2d 492 (7th Cir 1975). See also Frank v Hadesman and Frank Inc, 83 F3d 158,161
(7th Cir 1996) ("A customer list is property of the firm, and an employee ... who puts that in-
formation to personal use has violated a duty to the corporation.").
1912 [69:1901
Customer List Interpretation
underscored by the assignment thereto of independent market val-
ues."7" Rather than examining a customer's right to the information
contained in the customer lists, these cases treated the customer list as
corporate property that is both valuable and freely alienable.
More recent cases have not strayed from these cases' analysis or
their conclusions. For example, In re Andrews 7 involved a bankrupt
debtor who had sold his customer list as part of a pre-petition sale.7
The list sold for approximately $1 million and the validity of the sale
was not questioned. '
Another bankruptcy case, this one from 1997-well into the
Internet era- addressed the valuation of a customer list.5 Once
again, the court focused on a correct valuation of the list itself for the
purposes of sale rather than discussing the privacy rights of the cus-
tomers on the list.76
Other cases have permitted debtors to grant security interests in
customer lists, thereby acknowledging the debtors' property interest in
those lists and allowing the sale of the customer lists in the normal
course of business." In addition, statutes and commentators recognize
that customer lists are treated as assets that a company buys and sells.",
Notably absent from these discussions, however, is any discussion of
privacy issues or the rights of customers to retain an interest in the
personal information contained in the lists. By emphasizing the com-
panies' ability to grant alienable security interests, courts appear to
70 Uniservices, 517 F2d at 496.
71 80 F3d 906 (4th Cir 1996).
72 Id at 908.
73 See id. The court does not address the validity of the sale and treats it as unproblematic.
While this silence is not dispositive, it does suggest that the sale of the list was not controversial
and that the list was considered property of the estate.
74 According to some estimates, there were over 50 million Internet users over the age of
sixteen in the U.S. and Canada in 1997. See CommerceNet, Industry Statistics: Internet Popula-
tion, available online at <http:Ilwww.commerce.netlresearchlstatslwwwpop.html> (visited June
12,2002).
75 See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F3d 339,352 n 12 (7th Cir 1997).
76 See id:
The fact is that the debtor's list was generating $22 million a year in revenue. Even if the
debtor could not make money with it, maybe somebody else could. The debtor's customers
were a premium bunch: all were willing to pay high prices for good service, and the list
manifested that information.
77 See, for example, In re Roman Cleanser Co, 802 F2d 207,208 (6th Cir 1986) (recognizing
an interest in a trademark and the associated goodwill, including a customer list).
78 See, for example, Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC § 936(h)(3)(B)(v) (1994) (defining
"intangible property" from which income can be derived as including a "customer list"). Con-
sider also Steven L. Kroleski and David R. Rant, Use of Customer Lists: A Unified Code Is the
Solution, 15 Westchester Bus J 189,209 ("All lists should be considered assets of the employer, as
evidenced by the fact that, when a business is sold, monies are paid for such assets.").
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believe that offline lists do not present any privacy concerns for con-
sumers.
C. Privacy Issues
Even when courts discuss the privacy issues surrounding offline
customer lists, they conclude that privacy concerns are not sufficient
to restrict the sale of these lists. 9 Offline cases, therefore, while dis-
cussing the effect of customer lists on consumer privacy rights, never-
theless uphold lists' alienability.
For instance, courts have repeatedly upheld the right of compa-
nies to collect and sell personal information about their customers de-
spite the customers' protests that such sales invaded their right to pri-
vacy. In 1975, an Ohio Appeals Court upheld the right of American
Express to gather and sell customer information, as well as the right of
magazine publishers to solicit customers based on this data.' The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's practice of renting and selling
subscription lists constituted an invasion of privacy and unjust en-
richment.8' In allegations that are remarkably similar to those es-
poused by modern privacy advocates,n the plaintiffs contended that
customer lists invade their privacy by enabling others to "draw certain
conclusions about [their] financial position [and] social habits.' ' . The
plaintiffs further argued that the magazine publishers had invaded
their privacy by using customer lists to mail specially targeted adver-
tisements to the plaintiff's homesY' The court dismissed both these
allegations and held that the defendants' practices did not infringe on
any constitutionally protected right to privacy.8
Another example of judicial refusal to recognize customer pri-
vacy concerns may be found in the general practice of allowing a state
department of motor vehicles to sell personal information gathered
from drivers. Currently, several states permit their department of mo-
tor vehicles to sell personal information gathered from drivers."' La-
79 See Parts II.A and II.B.
80 Shibley v Time, Inc, 45 Ohio App 2d 69,341 NE2d 337,340 (1975).
81 See id at 338.
82 See Part I.C.
83 Shibley, 341 NE2d at 339.
84 See id.
85 See id ("[T]he right of privacy does not extend to the mailbox and therefore it is consti-
tutionally permissible to sell subscription lists to direct mail advertisers.").
86 See, for example, Illinois Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/2-123 (West 2001) (authorizing the
secretary of state of Illinois to sell drivers' personal information to select government officials
and agencies). But see Reno v Condon, 528 US 141, 151 (2000) (upholding the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, which restricts the ability of states to distribute drivers' personal infor-
mation); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322,108 Stat 2099, codified at 18
USC §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp 1998) (regulating the disclosure of personal information con-
tained in the records of state motor vehicle departments).
[69:19011914
Customer List Interpretation
mont v Commissioner of Motor Vehicles8 addressed the right of the
State of New York to sell information it had received through the
compulsory registration of its citizens at the department of motor ve-
hicles.! Although the DMV distributed information to businesses who
then used it to direct advertising to certain residents, the court dis-
missed the case and explained: "The mail box ... is hardly the kind of
enclave that requires constitutional defense to protect 'the privacies of
life.' The short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ...
is an acceptable burden."''
As both Shibley and Lamont demonstrate, courts considering the
practice of collecting and selling customer lists have generally rejected
customers' privacy claims. Given this precedent, why has online pri-
vacy become such an important issue? Have sensibilities changed, so
that we are more concerned with privacy now than we were before?
Or is there something unique about the Internet context that makes
us more concerned with privacy rights in cyberspace?
At least some cases suggest that the courts, if not the public, are
no more concerned with customer privacy in the traditional business
context now than they were fifty years ago. Dwyer v American Express
Co,"' decided in 1995, suggests that non-Internet companies continue
to be treated in line with earlier precedent. Dwyer is remarkably simi-
lar to Shibley, both in the claims presented and its holding. The plain-
tiffs in Dwyer alleged that American Express had gathered and sold
customer information, thereby invading their privacy. Relying primar-
ily on Shibley and Lamont, the court dismissed the claims and noted
that such privacy concerns were unfounded: "[D]efendants' practices
do not deprive any of the cardholders of any value their individual
names may possess."9' As the Dwyer opinion indicates, technology may
have developed significantly since Shibley, but the non-Internet world
has remained remarkably stable.
III. THE TECHNOLOGY SPLIT IS UNWARRANTED
If the Internet has changed data collection to the extent that col-
lecting personal information about consumers now presents entirely
different legal issues, a change in the underlying law may be justified.
For instance, if the online data is more susceptible to abuse or more
intrusive than offline data, it may be appropriate to have different
87 269 F Supp 880 (S D NY 1967).
88 See id at 882.
89 Id at 883.
90 273 MI1 App 3d 742, 652 NE2d 1351, 1357 (1995) (noting that the only damage plaintiffs
suffered as a result of the release of their personal information to other companies was a "surfeit
of unwanted mail").
91 Id at 1356.
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rules for online and offline companies. On the other hand, if the only
difference lies in the medium by which the information is gathered
and disseminated, then any distinction between them would be unjus-
tified. This Part compares the collection of customer lists across media
and concludes that any differences that exist are not significant-
enough to justify establishing different legal standards for Internet
companies.
A. How Different Is the Information Gathered from the Internet?
Contrary to popular opinion,2 it is not at all clear that signifi-
cantly more valuable or sensitive information is gathered online.
Many companies that provide the data collection capabilities about
which commentators have warned either do so without a personal
identifier, or have since shut down because of the tremendous costs
associated with collecting the data.9
Furthermore, it is not clear that the data collected by Internet
companies is any more intrusive than that collected by other busi-
nesses. Consider the following two sets of data that have been com-
piled by businesses doing customer research:
Set 1: Lists that analyze where customers shop, how much they
spend, their behavioral characteristics, and spending history. The
lists further categorize customers into groups such as "mail-order
apparel buyers, home-improvement shoppers, electronics shop-
pers, luxury lodgers, card members with children, skiers, frequent
business travelers, resort users, Asian/European travelers, luxury
European car owners, or recent movers."
Set 2: Lists that include "name, address, billing information,
shopping preferences, and family profiles, which include the
names and birth dates of children."'
It is difficult to detect significant differences between the two sets of
information or determine which set is more offensive or intrusive to a
92 See, for example, Michael Sonsino, U Pennsylvania: Study Addresses Customer Concerns
About Online Privacy, Safety, U-Wire, 2000 WL 26933934 (Sept 19, 2000) (reporting that con-
cerns about privacy and security hamper Internet shopping). See also Koster, 16 No 5 Computer
Law at 7 (cited in note 17) (arguing that the Internet has influenced privacy issues by reducing
the cost of information and by increasing the value of such information by improving the ability
of companies to link data and thus better target potential customers).
93 See Stephanie Miles, DoubleClick Halts Service That Targets Ads to Web Surfers, Wall St
J B6 (Jan 10, 2002) (describing how Doubleclick, an online advertising firm, dropped a service
that targeted advertisements at individual behavior based on data collected about where that
user had gone on the Web).
94 Dwyer, 652 NE2d at 1353 (describing the types of lists generated by American Express
to categorize and rank its cardholders).
95 Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Sues (cited in note 12).
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customer. Although information about children may be of special con-
cern, and therefore require additional legislation, there is no reason to
think that the information collected online about children will be sig-
nificantly different from that garnered offline. Most would probably
conclude that they are similar, and that any differences are negligible.
The first set, however, was collected offline by a credit card company96
and later determined to be freely aienable.7 The second set is an ex-
ample of data collected by Toysmart.com.n Although the two sets of
data appear similar, a court restricted the sale of the second set of data
to third parties.9 Furthermore, the FTC's lawsuits and settlements, as
well as the numerous legislative proposals and academic articles, have
only been directed toward online companies like Toysmart.com."°
B. The "Other Side" of Technology
For a moment, assume that Internet companies can use technol-
ogy to gather intrusive information about their customers more effec-
tively. Even if this is true, any conclusions about the new technology's
impact on privacy must account for the fact that technology is not
one-dimensional. The same advances in technology that companies
use to gather information for marketing can also be used to protect
customers from misuse of that information.
Several companies have developed new products to respond to
the demand for online privacy.'O' These products not only make it eas-
ier for a user to conceal her identity while shopping or web surfing,n
but they also enable her to avoid harassing emails and phone calls
from marketing organizations.)3
Moreover, most email systems employ various filters that screen
out unwanted junk mail.' Even if spam manages to pass through the
96 See Dwyer, 652 NE2d at 1353.
97 Id at 1356 (denying the plaintiffs' claim of invasion of privacy and consumer fraud and
thereby permitting the sale of customer lists).
98 See Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC Sues (cited in note 12).
99 See Part I.C.
100 See id.
101 See, for example, the TeleZapper home page, available online at
<http://vww.telezapper.com> (visited Feb 4, 2002) (advertising the "TeleZapper" as a product
that automatically removes customer phone numbers from telemarketers' databases). See also
<http://wwvw.epic.org/privacy/tools.htm> (visited Feb 4, 2002) (listing and making available for
download several software tools for customers who are concerned about Internet privacy).
102 See McGeveran, 76 NYU L Rev at 1826-33 (cited in note 27) (describing how P3P, an
innovative "privacy-enhancing technology," operates to protect the privacy of online users).
103 The producers of the TeleZapper, for instance, claim their product will remove customer
phone numbers from databases that are purchased and used by telemarketers. Removing the
phone numbers will therefore decrease the likelihood of receiving a telemarketers' call. See
<http:www.telezapper.com/faq.htm> (visited Aug 5,2002).
104 For example, Yahoo! Mail allows users to direct mail to different folders depending on
the sender or the subject title. See <http://mail.yahoo.com> (visited June 3,2002).
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various filters, today's technology makes it easy to delete it with just a
few clicks."' Nearly thirty years ago, Lamont ruled that junk mail did
not infringe on a person's right to privacy."6 Surely the change in tech-
nology has not made the trip to the "mailbox" any more "noxious." On
the contrary, given that it has become even easier to "take out the
trash," it is difficult to criticize unwanted junk mail as an intolerable
infringement on individual rights, even though the volume of such
mail may have increased substantially.
C. Technology's Privacy-Enhancing Capabilities
Some argue that limiting the sale of customer lists-or prohibit-
ing their sale altogether-would do much to benefit customers.''
However, customer lists often enable web companies to offer their
services for free or, at a minimum, for sharply reduced prices.' Web-
sites that want to attract visitors often must allow significant access for
free.' By collecting information about their visitors, and then selling it
to other companies, the online companies can stay in business while
providing a free service to a wide audience."0
Advances in technology have enabled Internet companies to
compile customer lists that can presumably be more detailed.'' Thus,
such lists can be used as a means to develop more personalized mar-
keting. Rather than becoming more intrusive, online companies may
become less intrusive because more accurate and focused advertising
may actually mean customers endure fewer unwanted contacts from
companies' marketing departments. ' 2 In fact, a survey conducted by
Privacy & American Business"3 suggests just how valuable customer
lists-or at least the uses of such lists-can be to the customers them-
selves. The survey found that most customers prefer receiving banner
105 Deleting mail on Yahoo! or Microsoft Outlook requires only selecting the message(s)
and clicking the "delete" button.
106 Lamont, 269 F Supp at 883 (claiming that a trip to the mail box "is an acceptable bur-
den").
107 See generally Miller and O'Rourke, 38 Houston L Rev 777 (cited in note 61).
108 See Hetcher, 7 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 130 (cited in note 4) (explaining how
online companies use data collection and processing as sources of revenue, which in turn allows
them to offer websites for free).
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See Koster, Zero Privacy at 7 (cited in note 17) ("The Internet has both facilitated the
gathering of personal data and, by improving the ability to link vast amounts of data to a particu-
lar individual, made the data more valuable").
112 But see Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices at 2-3
(cited in note 22) (stressing that privacy concerns likely have limited the growth of the online
marketplace).
113 Privacy & American Business, Executive Summary (July 1999), available online at
<http://www.pandab.orgldoubleclicksummary.htmil> (visited Feb 4, 2002) (asking a sample of
Internet users a series of questions about online personalized marketing).
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advertisements tailored to their personal interests.114 Furthermore, it
found that more than two-thirds of Internet users would willingly pro-
vide personal information in order to receive tailored ads.'
By providing personal information, the consumer can receive
more targeted solicitations and fewer advertisements in which she has
no interest. This reduces the amount of time she must spend searching
for the right products and services, and also decreases the time spent
disposing of superfluous offers. The company, on the other hand, gains
because it no longer has to spend money sending offers to individuals
who are not interested in its products, but can use its resources to
market to a select group who will be more likely to make a purchase.
Therefore, courts that place restrictions on the collection and sale of
customer lists should be careful to take these costs into account.
Courts need to recognize that the more tailored the customer list is to
the customer, the more valuable it will be to the company and to the
customers themselves.
D. There Is No Such Thing as an Online Company
So far, this Comment has assumed that online companies are dis-
tinguishable from offline companies. The Comment has adopted this
assumption only because it is reflected in the Toysmart.corn litiga-116 • 11718
tion,"" in academic literature, and in major legislative proposals. 8
The assumption, however, is false. There is no clear demarcation be-
tween online and offline companies or their respective customer in-
formation.
114 See id ("A majority of Internet users (61 percent) say they would be positive toward re-
ceiving banner ads tailored to their personal interests rather than receiving random ads.").
115 Id ("More than two-thirds of Internet users (68 percent) say they would provide per-
sonal information in order to receive tailored banner ads, if notice and opt out are provided.").
116 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W.
Thompson, available online at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysamrtthompsonstatement.htmi>
(visited Feb 4, 2002) ("This case is important because it directly considers the obligation of an
online business to its customers.") (emphasis added). See also Federal Trade Commission, Press
Release, FTC Sues (cited in note 12) ("Even failing dot-coins must abide by their promise to
protect the privacy rights of their customers."), quoting FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky.
117 See Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online:A Report at 40 (cited in note 5):
While American businesses have always collected some information from customers in or-
der to facilitate transactions, the Internet allows for the efficient, inexpensive collection of a
vast amount of information. It is the prevalence, ease, and relative low cost of such informa-
tion collection that distinguishes the online environment from more traditional means of
commerce and information collection and thus raises customer concerns.
See also id at 2 ("The world Wide Web is an exciting new marketplace for customers.") (empha-
sis added).
118 See Part I.D.
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For instance, a firm like Disney has a large web presence, with
sites such as ESPN.com, ABCnews.com, and Disney.com." 9 Yet, it ob-
viously also has a significant traditional, offline business.'0 It is impos-
sible to separate the two lines of business. Data flows throughout an
entire business and customers interact, not simply with a website, but
with all of the company's operations. For instance, on the Disney.com
site, visitors can buy tickets to the Disney theme parks or, in just two
clicks, get to the home page for ABC.' The futility of distinguishing
companies merely by the channel through which they provide services
is likely to increase as companies become more sophisticated in their
use of information and more adept at integrating their websites with
their primary businesses.
Multimedia conglomerates are not the only companies for which
classification between online and offline is difficult. Even the most
traditional companies have blurred the distinction. For example,
manufacturers of ball bearings offer a significant amount of informa-
tion over their websites and even permit customers to purchase their
products online." Since the customer order is placed online, it is un-
clear whether this information would be subject to the online or the
offline standard. Similarly, online companies have offices and physical
facilities where they conduct business. E*Trade, one of the most
prominent Internet brokerages, has financial centers located in New
York, San Francisco, and Boston.2
IV. THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OFTHE TECHNOLOGY SPLIT
Treating customer lists differently for online and offline compa-
nies is not simply harmless error. The technology split has serious,
negative ramifications for both companies and customers. For in-
stance, applying separate standards for companies creates inconsistent
laws. Separate standards are also counter-productive because they
create incentives for companies to change their structure in order to
avoid the distinction altogether. Furthermore, the distinction punishes
small online companies and encourages companies to have larger,
more diversified businesses. This Part examines the consequences of
treating online and offline customer lists differently.
119 See <http://www.espn.com> (visited Oct 12,2002); <http://www.disney.com> (visited Oct
12, 2002); <http://www.abcnews.com> (visited Oct 12, 2002). All three sites are owned by the
Disney Corporation and operated as part of the "Go" network.
120 ESPN, ABC and Disney all operate television networks as well as other offline ventures.
121 See <http://www.disney.com> (visited June 25,2002).
122 See, for example, <http://www.emersonbearing.com> (visited June 12,2002).
123 See, for example, <https://wwv.etrade.com> (visited June 12, 2002). They also operate
more than 11,000 ATMs. <https:lbank.etrade.com/access/locator.cfm> (visited June 12,2002).
1920 [69:1901
Customer List Interpretation
Large companies are, by definition, more likely to have greater
resources that can be used to gather information about more custom-
ers. The larger the company, on average, the more money it can devote
to marketing so that it can solicit customers for future business.
Smaller companies will have fewer points of interaction with their cus-
tomers and therefore will probably collect less detailed information
about each customer. I" Consequently, any policy that systematically
favors larger companies will be counterproductive and will likely
cause companies to consolidate and grow in order to capture that
advantage.
The distinction between online and offline companies is an ex-
ample of a policy that benefits large companies. Large companies de-
rive their advantage from a loose interpretation of the term "third
party." The term is typically used by website disclosure policies'2 and
also serves as the foundation for legislation.26 However, courts have
yet to provide a clear definition of the term7 7 One stumbling point is
that "third party" can mean something very different to a company
than it does to that company's customers. Is ABC News a third party
with respect to ESPN?'2 Most customers would probably think so,
while Disney almost surely would not. Because the term "third party"
remains vague, a company's assurance that it will not sell information
to third parties may be a very empty and misleading promise.
2'
Regardless of how the meaning of the term is eventually re-
solved, the result will almost surely favor companies with larger, more
diversified activities over smaller start-ups. To better illustrate this
point, imagine two companies that sell educational games to children.
Both companies have relatively similar websites and, consequently,
124 While there are certainly exceptions, larger companies tend to have larger web pres-
ences than their smaller competitors in the same industry. Furthermore, large companies may be
better able to encourage their offline customers to transact business online and therefore lever-
age their size for their online business.
125 Most website policies state that they will not share information with "third parties" See
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online at 20 (cited in note 5) (noting that a common "Pri-
vacy Policy Notice" often includes a statement promising that personal information will not be
shared with third parties). See, for example, EBay Says It May Sell Information on Users in Event
ofAcquisition, Wall St J B7 (Apr 3,2001) (noting that Toysmart posted a privacy statement on its
website promising "not to turn private customer information over to third parties").
126 For example, S 2928 permits the collection of information when the site provides notice.
Notice is defined as "a statement [identifying] the operator of the website and of any third party
the operator knowingly permits to collect" information (emphasis added).
127 See Chertok and Agin, 8 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 302-03 (cited in note 46) (discussing
how the bankruptcy courts crafted various resolutions to the "third party" issue in determining
whether purchasers of a debtor company may access that company's customer lists).
128 See text accompanying notes 119-20.
129 See Part I.C. See also Chertok and Agin, 8 Am Bankr Inst L Rev at 302-03 (cited in note
46) (noting how several companies have gotten around conditions on the sale of customers lists
by creatively interpreting the term "third party").
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similar customer lists. One of the websites, Subsidiary.com, is operated
by a large, multi-national conglomerate, BehemothCorp, that also
owns children's television programming, news stations, and numerous
hard copy publications, intended for both children and adults. The
other website, MiniCorp.com, is owned by a start-up company run by
several young entrepreneurs who have no source of income other
than venture capital funding. These companies are in competition with
one another, and both have privacy policies guaranteeing that they
will not sell customer information to "third parties."
What happens when the companies need to generate additional
cash flow? One option is to run back and get more financing, either
from its parent corporation (as Subsidiary.com would) or from its ven-
ture group (as MiniCorp.com would). Another option is to use the
customer information that is collected on their websites, but still fol-
low the privacy policies by not sharing information with third parties.
Subsidiary.com could almost certainly share its customer information
with the other divisions of BehemothCorp, such as its magazine divi-
sion, or use it to generate marketing opportunities for its children's
television shows. All of these companies belong to the same corporate
family that initially collected the information and therefore fall out-
side the loose definition of "third party." This, in turn, could encourage
BehemothCorp to fund the website of Subsidiary.com. If there are re-
strictions on the alienability of customer lists, such as an inability to
sell to third parties, MiniCorp.com has no other options. It cannot sell
or lease the information to others who might value the customer list.
Although MiniCorp.com will have invested just as much in its cus-
tomer list, it will reap significantly less return on its investment than
Subsidiary.com.
A company that cannot sell its customer list will also be at a dis-
advantage when attempting to obtain financing or generate cash flow.
Prospective investors in MiniCorp.com, discouraged by a lower rate of
return than the equivalent Subsidiary.com, as well as the likelihood of
a court battle over the customer information in the event of a bank-
ruptcy filing,'" will charge a higher price for their dollars or choose to
invest in the beneficiary of the loose "third party" definition-
BehemothCorp. Furthermore, even if MiniCorp.com were able to ob-
tain financing, its inability to sell its customer list, or share the list
across divisions like Subsidiary.com, means that it will have lower
earnings and cash flow. These factors may be enough to give a perma-
nent competitive edge to Subsidiary.com.
If MiniCorp.com goes out of business, it not only harms the com-
pany and its creditors, it harms consumers as well. Strict customer list
130 See Part I.C.
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laws reduce the ability for small companies to compete, thereby reduc-
ing choice for consumers and increasing costs. The laws would not
have the same effect on Subsidiary.com. For instance, when Disney
destroyed Toysmart.com's customer list, it probably did not suffer any
significant loss; it likely had a remarkably thorough list of similarly
situated customers.1
31
As this illustration demonstrates, large companies enjoy substan-
tial benefits from a loose definition of "third parties." Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the FTC has noted that large companies have been much
quicker to adopt privacy policies."' In addition to any benevolent in-
tentions and smart public policy rationales, these companies may have
recognized their comparative advantage over smaller companies. A
larger company would look more attractive to the customer because
of its privacy policy, but it has actually lost almost nothing by posting
such a policy. Because of the loose definition of third parties, the large
company with a privacy policy has not totally eliminated its ability to
alienate its customer lists. Although the Internet has been touted as a
great equalizer"3 -a market where the "little guy" can effectively
compete against the conglomerates"'-restrictions on the alienability
of customer lists may be one way the large companies can maintain
their dominance in the market.
The most telling sign that large companies recognize this advan-
tage is that, even when small companies try to avoid restrictive disclo-
sure policies, large companies take it upon themselves to restrict the
dissemination of customer information.'m Several large companies
now require that small companies comply with privacy guidelines in
order to advertise on their sites or otherwise take advantage of their
services. '-
131 Disney owned 60 percent of Toysmart.com and probably had a relatively similar cus-
tomer base. Scheler, 1255 PLI/Corp at 369 (cited in note 42).
132 See Federal Trade Commission, Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Report to Con-
gress 12-13 (July 1999), available online at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/osl1999199071privacy99.pdf> (vis-
ited June 12, 2002) ("Companies like IBM, Microsoft and Disney, which have recently an-
nounced, among other things, that they will forgo advertising on sites that do not adhere to fair
information practices are to be commended for their efforts, which we hope will be emulated by
their colleagues."). Compare Saul Hansell, Privacy Policy on Web Shifts as Profits Ebb, NY
Times Al (Apr 11, 2002) (noting that Yahoo! and Excite are changing privacy policies and seek-
ing to sell their customer lists).
133 See Tim Padgett, The Net Heads South (to Latin America), Tune B14 (Oct 8,2001).
134 See id.
135 Large companies may also be restricting the dissemination of information in order to
avoid more restrictive governmental policies. However, this Comment points out that it is also
clearly in their interest to do so in order to gain an advantage over small companies.
136 Federal Trade Commission, Self-Regulation at 12-13 (cited in note 132). See also
Hetcher, 7 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 97 at 142-43 (cited in note 4):
[L]arge sites devised a means to bring small sites into conformity with more respectful data
collection practices. Large sites began threatening to withhold advertising from sites that
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A final complication for courts is that, since there is no important
difference between online and offline companies or data, ' the sup-
posed distinction between these types of customer lists can be de-
scribed as, at best, arbitrary or overinclusive. If courts were to hold
that laws restricting the alienability of customer lists applied to all in-
formation collected or distributed online, the law could theoretically
apply to every company. If the law applies to all companies, it risks
violating established precedent.ln On the other hand, if courts drew a
distinction between online and offline companies, this distinction
would necessarily be arbitrary and would create unnecessary com-
plexity, cost and confusion. For instance, parties in a privacy dispute
would have to argue that the company, or the information it collects,
should be classified as online or offline-thereby increasing litigation
costs and creating uncertainty for businesses when they attempt to sell
customer lists or use them as collateral for raising capital."'
This Part has described how applying a different standard to
online and offline companies is counterproductive because it helps
large companies at the expense of smaller ones. The distinction actu-
ally benefits those companies that are most likely to engage in mass
solicitation and marketing campaigns. Large companies are also most
likely to be able to avoid the impact of privacy policies altogether by
broadly interpreting laws and disclosure policies. Small companies, on
the other hand, will either be harmed by their inability to transfer cus-
tomer lists or will attempt to avoid having a privacy policy altogether.
V. WHAT COURTS SHOULD Do
This Comment has demonstrated that courts, commentators, and
legislators treat customer lists differently for online and offline com-
panies. The Comment has also argued that this separate treatment is
both unwarranted and harmful.' ' This Part argues that courts con-
fronted with cases involving customer lists should recognize the sub-
stantial existing case law and focus on contract, rather than privacy,
law. Future legislation, moreover, should concentrate on how cus-
did not demonstrate adequate respect for privacy.... The FTC, then, is able to indirectly
promote its goal of data privacy by getting large websites to do its bidding.
137 See Parts III.A and III.D.
138 See Part II.
139 One way that online companies have attempted to respond to the uncertainty is by re-
wording and removing their disclosure policies to permit the sale of information in the event of a
sale or liquidation of the company. Tamara Loomis, Amazon Revamps Its Policy on Sharing
Data, NY L J 5 (Sept 21,2000) (noting that Amazon.com rewrote its privacy policy after learning
of Toysmart.com's inability to sell its list).
140 See Part IV.
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tomer information is used, instead of the medium through which it is
collected.
A. Recognize the Substantial Body of Case Law That Exists
Before getting caught up in the public's increasing concern over
customer privacy, courts should recognize that there is a substantial
body of case law that protects a company's right to its customer list.
4'
For over fifty years, the law has protected a company's right to create
customer listsU2 and has allowed those lists to be freely alienable.4 3 By
indicating that courts will not interfere, these judicial decisions pro-
vided an important incentive for companies to gather information
about customer preferences. Consequently, companies have been able
to provide customers with more focused marketing and better ser-
vice.'"
There will likely be changes in privacy laws in the future. In fact,
many of the current legislative proposals treat data gathered online
differently from data gathered from other sources.'45 However, the de-
cision to distinguish between online and offline companies, if made at
all, should be confined to the legislature. By ignoring precedent and
distinguishing between online and offline customer lists, courts will
only create distortions in the market, produce complex and expensive
litigation, and cause conflicting judicial decisions.
B. Contracts, Not Privacy
Once the rhetoric dies away, most of the cases involving online
customer lists will likely turn on the interpretation of the companies'
privacy policies. As the Toysmart.com litigation illustrated, a privacy
policy that promises not to "share information with third parties"
leaves a lot open for interpretation. The central issue in customer list
cases should be whether the company breached a contract with cus-
tomers,"not whether the customer has a privacy or property right to
the information."''
Returning the focus of the debate to contract law will also permit
the market to have a greater impact on privacy issues. If customers
141 See Part I.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Part ILI.C.
145 See Part I.D.
146 For commentary on the treatment of customer lists in bankruptcy and in contract law,
see generally Andrew B. Buxbaum and Louis A. Curcio, When You Can't Sell to Your Customers,
Try Selling Your Customers (But Not under the Bankruptcy Code), 8 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 395
(2000). See also Miller and O'Rourke, 38 Houston L Rev at 795-807 (cited in note 61) (discuss-
ing the contractual aspects of customer lists).
2002] 1925
The University of Chicago Law Review
demand privacy policies, they can patronize those companies that post
the policies and boycott those that do not. The market has already had
tremendous success in encouraging companies to post privacy policies
in the first place.' Now customer groups can refocus their attention
by ensuring that the policies are appropriately worded and that they
are adopted by both large and small companies. While the policies can
be adopted online and offline, courts will not have to differentiate
among technologies. Instead, they can simply enforce contracts. Courts
have already applied this reasoning successfully to offline companies.''
If the sale of customer lists were analyzed through contract principles,
the results of high-profile bankruptcies like that of Toysmart.com and
Living.com might have been very different. Instead, discussion fo-
cused on property rights in private information,' thereby creating a
counterproductive result that favors large companies over small.
C. Guidelines for Future Legislation
Customers have legitimate reasons for wanting to prohibit the
collection and use of certain types of customer information. Protecting
child privacy and limiting the distribution of health records, for in-
stance, might be extremely important goals regardless of whether the
information is distributed online or offline. These policies, however,
should not depend on where the information was gathered. While cus-
tomer advocates may argue that technology makes abuse more likely
online, companies do not cause harm merely by gathering or transmit-
ting information.
Customer privacy can only be violated through the use of that in-
formation. Although privacy advocates have focused on the collection
of information with the understandable belief that the information is
being gathered so that it can be used, punishing the collection of in-
formation is the wrong approach. Regulators can avoid the technology
split and also provide the appropriate level of protection simply by
requiring customers to demonstrate a way in which their information
was used that materially harmed them or violated a current law.
Consumers have a variety of causes of action depending on what
kind of information was used, as well as how it was used. For instance,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act protects
against the distribution of certain health information.'0 The Children's
147 For a general discussion, see Hetcher, 7 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 97 (cited in note
4) (developing a case study of website privacy norms and examining how market forces have
shaped and enforced these norms).
148 See Part II.
149 See text accompanying notes 38-46.
150 See the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), Pub L No 104-
191, 110 Stat 1939 (1996), codified at 29 USC § 1181 et seq (1994 & Supp 1999) (protecting the
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Online Privacy Protection Act"' limits the companies' ability to use in-
formation about children.n Content-based laws such as these will be
more effective than those based purely on whether the information
was gathered online or offline.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to believe that the technological revolution has
dramatically changed the world over the last several decades, and in
many ways, the world is dramatically different. However, the law of
customer lists is at least one subject where courts can benefit by study-
ing previous case law and applying existing legal structures to help
them answer today's issues. Perpetuating a technology split is coun-
terproductive. Instead, lawyers, judges, regulators, and customer advo-
cates who are concerned about privacy should recognize that a sub-
stantial body of case law on customer lists exists, and they should fo-
cus on policing contracts rather than on advocating new privacy rights.
Finally, whether information is sensitive does not depend on how it
was transmitted, but on the nature of the information. This Comment
has advocated that courts and legislators should focus, not on the
method by which customer information is gathered, but on how that
information will be used.
privacy of certain health information); Letter by Direction of Commission to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (Feb 17,
2000), available online at <http:/wwv.ftc.gov/be/vOOO001.htm> (visited June 12, 2002) (describ-
ing proposed privacy standards under HIPAA).
151 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, Pub L No 105-277, 112 Stat 2681-728 (1998),
codified at 15 USC § 6501 et seq (2000) (establishing rules for the regulation of practices in con-
nection with the collection and use of information from and about children on the Internet). See
also Ashcroft v ACLU, 122 S Ct 1700 (2002) (upholding a portion of COPA but remanding for
further consideration); Title V of the Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information, Pub L No
106-102,113 Stat 1436 (1999), codified at 15 USC §§ 6801-10 (2000) (promulgating standards for
the use of private information in the financial industry).
152 Although the Act applies to online companies, the focus is on a type of information, not
a transportation medium.
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